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Abstract: The crisis in the reproducibility of experiments invites a re-evaluation of methods of 
inquiry and validation procedures. The text challenges current assumptions of knowledge 
acquisition and introduces G-complexity for defining decidable vs. non-decidable knowledge 
domains. A “second Cartesian revolution,” informed by and in awareness of anticipatory 
processes, should result in scientific methods that transcend determinism and reductionism. 
Physics and physics-based disciplines convincingly ascertained themselves by adequately 
describing the non-living. A complementary perspective should account for the specific causality 
characteristic of life by integrating past, present, and future. Knowledge about anticipatory 
processes facilitates attainment of this goal. Society cannot afford the dead-end street of 
reductionism. Science, itself an expression of anticipatory activity, makes possible in our days 
alternative understandings of reality and its dynamics. 
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To save science [1], when it is needed more than ever, requires the re-examination of some 
fundamental assumptions informing scientific activity. Failed reproducibility, the crisis of this 
hour, such as in biomedical sciences [2] [3, 4], or, notoriously, in psychology [5], affects more 
than the validation of experiments. As a matter of fact, the experimental method in its standard 
formulation becomes questionable. For science, social, economic, and political consequences 
notwithstanding, to continue on the same path without questioning the premises that lead to the 
current breakdown, is prone to self-destruction [6]. It is true that “Science has been peculiarly 
resistant to self-examination” [7], but “metric incentives”, i.e., quantifying goals and rewards, 
will not change the situation. They would further instrumentalize a questionable perspective.  
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The situation in which science finds itself is comparable to the one that corresponds to the “flat 
Earth” view, which even after Ptolemy retained some currency. 
 
Data about the reproducibility crisis 
Thesis 1: Experiments intended to advance knowledge of the living are useful but not 
reproducible.  
Against the background of successful technological innovation grounded in physical science, 
the life sciences, while seeking legitimacy in the guise of chimeric experimental replication, are 
delivering below expectations and societal need. If the object of the experiment is the physical 
substratum, reproducibility can be expected, provided that the experiment is properly designed 
and carried out. For instance, one could re-wire a genome (introduce new links between 
unrelated genes), or measure an interaction between biological components with a high-degree of 
precision, similar to how a chemist would study the attractive forces between non-living 
elements. But such experiments contribute to knowledge of physics or chemistry, not to the life 
sciences, whose object is change in the living. Moreover, the same is not meaningful for 
exploring, for example, protein folding or anticipatory genetic expression, or for that matter 
evolutionary dynamics. We shall examine why this is the case.  
 In contradistinction to experiments in “physics or astronomy or geology” [8] [9] —
knowledge domains identified as test provable by the vast majority (90%) of researchers —failed 
reproducibility occurs almost exclusively in life science experiments. From the many reports 
published, we learn that in particular domains, 80% of published results from researchers who 
earned the respect of their peers proved to be irreproducible. In one review [10], findings from 
the biotech company Amgen are detailed. Up to 100 of its researchers attempted to corroborate 
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data from 53 cancer research reports from well-known facilities, published in leading journals. 
Only 6 of the studies proved to be reproducible (i.e., ca. 10%). The pharmaceutical branch of the 
Bayer conglomerate had no better luck in seeking validation for research in oncology, women’s 
health, and cardiovascular medicine. 
The crisis of reproducibility has undermined the credibility of leading scientific publications 
(Nature, Science, eLife, PNAS, etc.)—none eager to address fundamental science. They literally 
censor contributions to the subject not in line with the views they promote. Screening by staff 
eliminates the opportunity for peer review. For all practical purposes such publications have 
become self-styled newsletters for the extremely profitable industry of experiments. They preach 
to the choir instead of offering a platform for scientific debate. One example: lizard mobility 
framed within the momentum conservation principle of physics [11]. A lizard-like robot looks 
good on a journal cover. It does not matter that the experiment does not address the real subject. 
The Radio Shack toy conveniently made into a “lizard” robot proves the physics. A 2-
dimensional tail modeling confirms (through circular thinking) the false hypothesis. Anticipatory 
aspects of the lizard’s mobility were fully ignored.  A review of this experiment, submitted to 
Nature, never made it past the screening.  
The crisis undermined as well the activity of funding agencies (governmental or private). 
Some, such as the national Institutes of Health (NIH) rushed to issue new grant guidelines 
without understanding where the problem lies. Guided by a concept of knowledge acquisition 
generalized from physical science to the living, they disburse public money for more research 
equipment, but not for appropriate hypotheses. Stimulating alternative ways of thinking seems to 
no longer be part of their mission. Talent is wasted on servicing expensive machines for data 
acquisition instead of advancing new ways of thinking. And when the cheap labor of graduate 
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students is not available, the jobs are outsourced to scientists in countries desperate to have 
access to new machines. I experienced this in several laboratories, but most painfully at the 
Bechtereva Institute of the Russian Academy in St. Petersburg, where providing service in data 
acquisition replaced the once respected original work on advancing hypotheses regarding the 
brain. 
The American National Academies, as well as the British Academy of Medical Sciences, the 
Max Planck Institute and many other prestigious institutions, were prompted to examine the 
disturbing facts [12]. A new field of inquiry, focused on experiment replication and reliability 
before the experiments are carried out is ascertaining itself [13] [14]. However, we know that 
“when a measure of success,” such as metrics “becomes a target, it loses its significance” [15]. 
Be this as it may, this crisis should not go to waste into more pseudo-science (based on the ever 
fashionable probability theory, Bayes, or some fancy mathematics) about bad science, or how to 
stifle science by further institutionalizing rules and regulations soon to become a goal in 
themselves. Without addressing the origins of the problem, the scientific community will only 
continue to reproduce the never proven assumptions upon which the majority of its activity is 
still carried out. 
 
Addressing a systemic condition 
The replication quandary is an opportunity not to be missed. The relation between various 
knowledge domains and the need to adapt research methods to the specific dynamics of the 
subject that scientists attempt to describe is an unavoidable subject. Opening an in-depth 
discussion of this subject, as we shall try herein, would be in many ways a promising beginning.  
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Data dredging, omission of null results (nobody wants to hear about them), underpowered 
studies, and underspecified methods or weak experimental design are symptomatic of 
weaknesses brought up in the discussion of replication failure. A small-size sample saves effort 
but undermines robustness. Open data, always desirable, more collaboration, automation—where 
human error can be avoided without altering the meaning of the outcome—and similar 
methodical suggestions ought to be considered. But ultimately they are not the answer. 
Therefore, now more than ever before the scientific community has to come to a rather sobering 
realization: eliminating weaknesses such as those mentioned will not change the systemic 
condition that resulted in failed replication in life sciences. The lack of reproducibility is only a 
symptom of a deeper reaching malaise: the refusal to accept alternative conceptions of reality 
and its extremely rich dynamic forms. 
As opposed to the non-living, the living is endowed with control processes manifest at each 
of its levels—from cells to organism to interactions with the world. There is freedom at each 
level, and there are interactions expressed as constraints. What I describe here goes beyond the 
hierarchy theory (of Pólya, continued by Pattee and Rosen, among others). My preference is the 
Principle of Minimal Interaction [16]: interaction among constituents at a lower level of the 
organism hierarchy follows the path of minimizing external input. For instance, in motoric 
expression, each joint is under its own neural control. Local interaction among elements is such 
that the outcome (motoric expression) is minimally dependent on the output of other elements. 
On the global level, the outcome of the structural unit (e.g., elbow joint) is minimized by changes 
in the output of other elements (the other joints in the kinematic chain). 
To the best of my knowledge nobody involved in the evaluation of the situation (by no means 
new) has issued a call to the scientific community to re-evaluate the underlying assumptions 
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upon whose basis knowledge acquisition and confirmation are pursued. The scientific 
community ought to come to the realization that experiments different from those that undergird 
the progress of physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology and the like are unavoidably non-
reproducible. Science practitioners have tacitly accepted reproducibility since the early stages of 
the Cartesian grounding of the experimental method, i.e., the reductionist-deterministic model. 
Experiment was always congenial to inquiry; reproducibility affirmed an expectation that 
became the epistemological premise: determinism. This was never a matter of philosophy, as 
some frame it, but one of practical consequences. Replication of experiment, or for that matter of 
medical treatment, has become a matter of public concern because it is not about one or another 
scientist, or physician, missing the expected threshold of acceptance. This is about failed science 
in an age of higher than ever expectations, given the significance of knowledge in general, and, 
in particular, of the living, for the future of humankind. The critical re-evaluation of the 
epistemological premise is the only rational path left to pursue.  
Indeed, machines can be built (and were successfully built) on account of physics and 
chemistry. They are supposed to be as pre-determined as possible. Their functioning is repetitive. 
But during the timeline of the machine revolution, the understanding of life has improved only 
slightly. Everything that lends itself to the building of yet another machine can be reproduced-- 
that’s what machines are for. But they are not science about the living. That is, they are not even 
science about the living beings who made the machines. The lever is an extension of the arm, but 
not a theory of motoric expression, even less of muscles, tendons, bones, joints, etc. The artificial 
neuron inspired by the living neuron is a mathematical construct of extreme application potential. 
But it is not knowledge about the neuron that inspired it, and it is not about any neuronal 
processes. Albeit, we are still in a rudimentary phase of scientific development regarding aspects 
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of life (such as intuition, emotion, creativity, spectrum diseases, etc.) associated with motoric 
expression or neuronal activity (to mention only two aspects). At the same time, we benefit from 
the sophisticated machinery in production facilities or deployed in deep learning, inspired by the 
living neuron. One such machine beat the world champion in Go (a game more complicated than 
chess, but still of permutation choices in a finite space); another imitates the art of the masters of 
painting. 
Research, instead of speculation, is a shared choice that scientists made—giving science its 
impetus. Nevertheless, the expectation that research is best validated through reproducible 
experiments, no matter what the subject or purpose, became questionable. The empirical 
evidence accumulated suggests the need to re-examine this expectation. In view of progress in 
science, it is only logical to think that reductionist and deterministic explanations are begging for 
complementary perspectives. This in itself is an argument that cannot be ignored for the 
suggested re-examination. The understanding of what Newton called Nature, under which label 
he aggregated both the physical and the living, might prove as inadequate in our time as it was 
when it was articulated.  
 
A question discarded 
After vitalism was debunked, and replaced by “mechanism” [17], science rejected the 
distinction between the living and the non-living. This rejection is quite surprising, since in 
science you don’t discard a question because it was improperly answered, or because the 
alternatives answers are not aligned with a dominant view. The foundational works of Walter 
Elsasser [18], and Robert Rosen [19], not to mention Erwin Schrödinger [20], advanced views of 
nature different from those of Descartes and Newton and their followers. Their contributions 
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were pretty much ignored at the time they were published. Elsasser and Rosen articulated 
arguments that were quite different in their perspectives: Elsasser within a physics-inspired 
perspective, Rosen in mathematical language. Both deserve a closer look at this moment of 
questioning the research and validation methods of life sciences. Both provided proof that the 
living is heterogeneous, purposeful, and anticipatory, as opposed to the non-living, which is 
homogenous, purpose-free, and reactive. These distinctions have certainly earned the attention of 
scientists—even those who do not read any reports older than five years. If, indeed, to know is to 
be aware of distinctions—especially those of a fundamental nature, corresponding to their 
different dynamics—such distinctions cannot be eliminated by fiat—or worse, just ignored.  
While physics and physics-based theories adequately describe the non-living, there remains a 
need for a complementary perspective that expresses the nature of life. What defines this 
perspective is the fact that the specific causality characteristic of life is accounted for by 
integrating past, present, and possible future. The living changes in a way different from the non-
living. The causality characteristic of the living is much richer than that of the physical, if for no 
other reason at least because the living is reactive (like the physical) and anticipatory (which the 
non-living is not). However, the scientific community, conditioned by an education set on the 
Cartesian foundation at the expense of any alternatives, is reluctant to accept this. Moreover, the 
description of change in the living calls for particular means and methods to properly capture it. 
Measurement and, by extension, the limited model of experiment, appropriate for describing 
physical non-living entities return incomplete, and at times confusing, knowledge when applied 
to capturing life change. 
Causality, i.e., how and why things change regardless of their specific nature, proved to be 
richer than what classical determinism ascertained. Under “things” belongs not only a stone that 
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eventually turns into sand, but also earthquakes, the sequence of seasons, the day-and-night 
cycle, women’s monthly cycle, the way humans think, the intelligence of plants, the adaptive 
nature of the microbiota (to name only a few). The matter from which physical entities (not 
endowed with life) are made remains the same, subject to what the laws of thermodynamics 
describe, in particular increased entropy. The living, from the simplest monocell to the human 
being is in an uninterrupted state of remaking itself, sui generis re-creation of its constitutive 
cells. It is neg-entropic. The re-making, i.e., renewal, of cells takes place at various rhythms: 
some are renewed almost daily; others over weeks, months, years, and others not at all. 
 
Fig. 1. Unbounded world as open system 
 
Determinism, the characteristic causality of physical phenomena, is convincingly relevant to 
the physics and chemistry of the living. Its description, for instance, through experimental data, 
returns an incomplete explanation of the specific nature of the changing living. Just to present an 
example along this line: physical forces (e.g., pulls, compressions and stretching, distortions) 
applied to a cell can further affect it, probably more than the inherited genetic code does [21, 22]. 
Taking both physical forces and the genetic code into consideration affords an understanding of 
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cell changes that neither can deliver alone. Non-determinism, describing a relation between 
cause and effect that takes the form of a multitude of possible outcomes, sometimes 
contradictory, pertains to change as an expression of something being alive, influencing its own 
change. Changes due to physical forces applied on cells (think about cutting yourself with a 
sharp knife, or falling against a rock) and genetic processes governing dynamics are interwoven. 
There is no way to unequivocally predict whether a cell becomes cancerous or simply divides in 
a process of self-healing. This is neither randomness nor stochastic expression—place holders 
for the notion of non-determinism, which is almost never acknowledged in its full expression 
(different from randomness). 
To know how the physical changes is to infer from a quantitatively described past state to a 
future state, under assumptions usually defined as initial conditions (also expressed numerically).  
Knowledge of the process underlies our ability to predict a future state. One description, 
sometimes rich in detail, captures the process. To know how the living changes requires more 
than the physics-based description or what chemistry, usually associated with life, ascertains. 
The empirical observation of changes in the living always leads to multiple descriptions, 
corresponding to multiple possible states, sometimes simultaneous, none exclusive of the other. 
An adequate explanation of change in the living requires integration of inferences from past 
states with interpretations of the meaning of possible future states together with the possible 
paths to them. Anticipation is expressed in actions informed by possible future states [23]. The 
domain of the possible is by no means less real than that of what is (the extant). The ontology of 
the living entails that of the possible. A suggestive analogy is justified here: potential energy is 
no less energy than that at work in a physical or living process. 
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The framing of change within the respective consequences, different in the physical and the 
living, is key to understanding their difference. The causality specific to interactions in the 
physical realm, transcending Galileo’s world, is described in Newtonian laws—action-reaction, 
in particular. It was further refined in relativity theory, and for the micro-level of matter in 
quantum mechanics.  The causality specific to interactions in the living, which is purposeful, 
includes, in addition to what the laws of physics describe quantitatively, the realization of 
significance—What does it mean?—in connection to the possible future. For instance, the 
question “What does it mean?” is the implicit question addressed in each synapse. 
Photosynthesis is the outcome of meaningful processes, not of data processing at the molecular 
level. Numbers do not play any role; they do not even exist at that level. We can use them to 
describe the process (or at least part of it). At the neuronal level much guessing takes place, 
sometimes felicitous, sometimes not. The same holds true for cell interaction. Protein expression 
allows for electron transfer across membranes, but this does not make the process machine-like 
(as Dutton [24] is inclined to describe it), and does not make electron transfer a characteristic of 
life. The construct called number (to which we shall return) emerges at a higher level than neural 
activity or cellular expression. The construct called “machine” is the outcome of mathematics, 
and not a characteristic of life. As mentioned above, we can use numbers to describe them, but in 
doing so, we need to realize that such descriptions (i.e., representations) are incomplete. Of 
extreme significance is the fact that the living, in addition to the constraints of physics, or those 
associated with molecular chemistry, is subject to contingent rules of behavior, expressed as 
anticipatory action. This is usually brushed aside, or trivialized (as in identifying historicity and 
contingency [25].  
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How did we get here? The theology of reductionism 
The consensus view was summed up in the Preface to a Committee Report to the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1970: “Life can be understood in terms of the laws that govern and the 
phenomena that characterize the inanimate, physical universe, and indeed, at its essence, life can 
be understood only in the language of chemistry.”  This became the official doctrine of how 
science would be carried out in the USA, pretty much like dialectical materialism was in the 
Soviet Union. Those who still questioned the reductionist position—they were not fired or jailed 
for this—received an encouraging face-saving line: “Until the laws of physics and chemistry had 
been elucidated, it was not possible even to formulate the important, penetrating questions 
concerning the nature of life.” Philip Handler [26], at that time president of the National 
Academy of Sciences, published these thoughts in the “Preface to Biology and the Future of 
Man—a National Research Council Report.” Thus, what used to be the dominant but not 
exclusive view among scientists became the dogma of science (like the “flat Earth” was until 
Ptolemy, and even past him). The 1989 Opportunities in Biology report [27] obviously reflects a 
new, “state-of-the-art” (mentioning “recombinant DNA, scanning tunneling microscopes, and 
more”) focus on the molecular scale of life. Nevertheless, it remains aligned with the position 
adopted almost 20 years back. It should not surprise that the current state of the art in knowledge 
acquisition and dissemination pertinent to the living—another 30 years later—is evidently the 
consequence of the official “theology” of science. It became a form of science fundamentalism. 
Of course, such a drastic characterization, which has to be extended to the ever-deepening 
machine reductionism, begs to be well grounded.  
The machine model of reductionist determinism, made explicit in the Cartesian perspective, 
was the clock, followed by hydraulic, pneumatic, electric, and all kinds of engines. In our days, 
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they were replaced, in their role as the model of the human, by the computer (the 1989 report 
takes note of it), and are expressed as algorithmic reductionism. It is quite useful to understand 
the process. Machines originate in the making of tools. Starting with the lever, the pulley, the 
inclined plane, machines were made, like tools before, as extensions of the body itself. They 
were supposed to ease labor and make it more efficient. All other machines came into existence 
as constructs of the same nature: imitate some human activity with the aim of augmenting the 
output of labor; or, as with the computer, imitate the brain and its output. The making of 
something that seems to acquire qualities beyond those endowed upon it is a subject of 
dialectic—a reasoning method for establishing the truth of arguments. The Young Hegelians of 
the 19th century extended this discussion to the dialectics of ideas. They were aware of the fact 
that words, or numbers, or languages (including those of science) could take on the appearance 
of being independent of those who originated them. In discussing the Christian god, they also 
took note of the dialectic of making tools and relating to them: tools seemed more powerful than 
their makers, as though they were endowed with what appeared as superhuman qualities. The 
same dialectic of self-deception (i.e., they seemed more powerful than their makers, as though 
they had magical properties) was at work in creating social institutions and political systems. An 
inversion takes place: “God” was made by humans in order to explain what appeared as 
transcending the individual, or even the group sharing in the naming. Such a construct is useful 
for explaining phenomena of a scale different from those involving direct interaction or human 
reasoning. After constructing the entity “god,” “God” appears to be the originator of those who 
made it (or wrote commandments attributed to it), as though it existed independent of the maker, 
moreover as the Maker of its makers.  
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The machine was meant to augment human abilities. It is an expression of applied 
knowledge, informed by human creativity. In performing better than the humans who made 
them, and even independent of them (the hydraulic machine, for instance, or the pendulum, or 
the computer), machines appeared as though they were the blueprint of life itself. The 
understanding of the heart, the lungs, or the brain as machines led to the inverse statement: the 
heart (or brain, or lungs) is nothing but a machine. With the advent of the “machine of 
machines”—the computer—the human being became the tool of its own tool—a reduction. This 
understanding is objectified in ideology—the logic of our ideas—pretty much like that declared 
in the theology of physics and chemistry, to which the living has been reduced. Like the god 
concept, it was never proven that the reduction to physics and chemistry—given that the living is 
embodied in matter—or the reduction to machines, affords a better understanding of what life is, 
or that it represents more than analogy. The belief in a god results in self-reinforcing ideas and 
actions: for instance, living according to commandments, or getting married, or finding peace 
with oneself. The recently proclaimed “miracle medicine,” extending life by 20-30 years [28] 
[29] exemplifies the idea (based on the just released account issued by the Harvard School of 
Medicine—even though the same has been known for a long time). The same process of self-
reinforcement holds true for machines and physico-chemical reductionism—it’s a placebo effect, 
which is a particular form of anticipation expression. 
Concepts and views that document the continuity of questioning the premises that resulted in 
the current crisis of reproducibility, and implicitly in questioning a rather limited understanding 
of experimental evidence, make up a large body of contributions from scientists and 
philosophers. Let us take note of the fact that neither Galileo’s mechanics, nor Newton’s theory, 
nor Einstein’s, nor the still under-defined quantum mechanics is the outcome of experiment. That 
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experimental evidence confirmed them is beyond question. The expressive power of deduction 
exceeds that of incomplete inductions embodied in experiment. Each of the descriptions 
mentioned corresponds to entailed processes in the world. That is the source of their predictive 
power: a future state can be inferred from a past state, provided that we consider initial 
conditions. Darwin, aiming at being the Newton of biology, based his evolution theory on ample 
empirical observations (his own as well as those made by others over time). Nevertheless, 
evolution is un-entailed [30]: one cannot pre-state a future evolutionary state, like physics pre-
states the future position of a particle or of a rocket. Gould [31] dealt with the contingency of 
evolutionary processes. The “replaying the tape” thought experiment he proposed, in reference to 
experimental data from the seas of the Burgess Shale, implicitly affirmed that there are no 
biological laws. That is, biology is idiographic, in contrast to physics, which is nomothetic (we 
shall return to this). Discussions of Gould’s views [32, 33], [34], [35], [36], are relevant to what 
we discuss because they brought up experiments. One of them is the long-term evolution project 
(using evolving populations of E.coli bacteria [37]); the other concerns macro-evolution [38]. 
Without entering into details, let us take note of the fact that these experiments showed that the 
closed system of the experiment makes the expression of holistic dependencies characteristic of 
the open system of nature impossible. They are successful for reproducing premises, but not for 
documenting contingency, or undermining Gould’s views. “Convergent evolution as natural 
experiment” [39] addresses iterated evolutionary outcomes, conceding that histories can be 
generalized, but are not law-like generalizations. 
This in itself defines an epistemological horizon: in order to cope with change, including 
their own, humans describe it, hoping to find in the description clues concerning possible 
consequences. Literature documents how descriptions evolved from the pictorial shorthand 
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associated with incipient humankind to language and to progressively more abstract 
representations [40], the languages of science. 
 
Knowledge is representation 
Knowledge, in its variety of forms (transitory, conjectural, implicit, explicit, instinctual, 
emotional, rational, etc.), is the outcome of learning. The living, in all its known forms, learns 
continuously. In some ways, evolution is the aggregate expression of how learning supports life 
in its continuous change. Knowledge acquisition is the expression of anticipatory action: the 
contingent, possible future explains the need for knowledge. The process is non-deterministic: it 
can, when the knowledge informing life actions is meaningful, reinforce life changes; or, when it 
is not appropriate, undermine them. 
To explain how knowledge is acquired along the timeline of life is to pursue a never-ending 
spiral [41]. 
 
Fig. 2. Knowledge expresses the open ended learning experience of the living 
 
Knowledge of physics or chemistry, that is, at a level of generality higher than that characteristic 
of cell activity, of tissues, of organisms, of individuals, is the expression of anticipatory action in 
regard to the living and non-living component of reality. Physico-chemical aspects of the 
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interaction between the living and the world (once again: living and non-living) are part of a 
larger dynamics, in which they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for knowledge 
acquisition. In this process, in addition to processing what is, the living generates a new reality, 
i.e., representations, upon which it acts. 
Representation is not neutral. In the representation, the represented is reduced to whatever is 
intentionally, or accidentally, of interest, to what is significant. The illusion that a representation, 
such as a number, is objective, independent of the representer, is the source of the many 
“religions” developed inside science over time. A second illusion is that representations are like 
mirror images of what they represent. In reality, each representation is also constitutive of what it 
references. Words make reality just as tools make reality. Time representation, as interval 
clocked by a machine, is one of the most obvious examples. Rosen [42], fully dedicated to 
finding more adequate descriptions of life (such as his model theory) worked hard to prove that 
the origin of the measurement method corresponds to the mystical understanding of numbers in 
Pythagoras’s idealism. Paradoxically, the idealism of the number, i.e., the idolatry of numbers, 
undergirds the experimental method meant to reject idealism. In the broader epistemological 
perspective of science, the goal is to achieve objectivity: how to know the world independent of 
who tries to understand and describe it, and independent of the means to represent it. The fact 
that the description ultimately expressed in a language (natural or artificial) makes objectivity 
dependent on the relation between expressive power of language and its precision has to be taken 
into consideration. The more precise language of Yes (1) and No (0, zero), “spoken” by digital 
machines, is more “objective” than the ambiguous natural language spoken by scientists 
expressively (one can even say artfully) describing natural phenomena. 
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In search of objectivity, the “knowing” subject had to be done away with. For physical 
processes, such as the falling of a stone, or for that matter a lunar or solar eclipse, it really does 
not matter who observes them. The equations, the sketch, the picture, the video, the animation, 
and the sentences describing them capture different aspects of the process. The outcome of 
experiments pertinent to the law of physics describing them are independent of characteristics of 
human perception. The experiments affirm an understanding of dynamics whose underlying time 
is nothing other than duration—between cause and effect. The gravity machine called 
“pendulum” (eventually packed into a clock) labels intervals, which correspond to diurnal time. 
It objectifies an understanding of time that assumes that there are no differences between the 
living and the non-living. Late in his life, Einstein realized the error of connecting time to the 
physical clock (i.e., a machine)—a position more or less consistent with the discovery of the 
limited speed of light (once again: independent of whether it is observed by a machine or a 
human being). Living time experiences, not reducible to their physics, are not clocked. The 
continuous renewal of cells in the organism exemplifies the idea. The renewal processes are 
timed: which sequence of events (physical, chemical, or informational in nature) or which 
configuration (of matter, energy, symbols, etc.) is significant for the maintenance of life, for 
reproduction, for creativity. Instead of duration independent of the observer, we have the 
meaning of time, pertinent to observation and to the observer. Among cells, as well as among 
neurons, interactions are slow. The speed of light, in respect to which duration is referenced, is 
actually of no significance at the cell level (cells are tightly packed). The experimental evolution 
project involved the cloning of bacteria in order to produce genetically identical populations—
which would be an anomaly in nature. Of course, biological time was reduced to duration, and in 
effect the experiment became one in duration of adaption to a new, artificial, environment. The 
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bacteria experiment at Michigan State University pre-empted the anticipatory expression, 
reducing life processes to physico-chemical processes. 
Time in the living of course reflects the physics of gravity. In addition, biological self-
preservation prompts the anticipatory action of the organism (as a whole) as it avoids hurt in the 
process of falling. This anticipatory action takes place at a different timescale: faster than real 
time, i.e., faster that physical duration, as it is described and exemplified by recordings on film or 
digital media. (More on this in [43]). The physics is expressed in the description of the fall: 
always the same. The biology is expressed in the timescale within which anticipatory action—
not always successful—allows for avoidance of getting hurt. We think faster than real time; 
distributed thinking engages the entire body, of many integrated clocks—to  use the machine 
name for labeling them—“ticking” at different timescales, many of them variable. 
The incipient machine concept (de la Mettrie, Descartes), as the concrete embodiment of 
determinism and reductionism, was hypostasized in the larger context of an economic system 
dependent upon machines. Since Descartes’ time, science became the religion of its own never-
proven assertion concerning the living as a machine, and causality as determinisms. There was a 
historic necessity to machines, as there was historic necessity to the attempt to extend the 
rationality embodied in them to the living. The practicality of machine understanding of the 
world reflects that of the machine as a means of production. Since that time, experimental 
evidence has meant the reproduction of machine reproducibility, i.e. the “production” of 
knowledge, instead of discovery. 
 
The ideology of science  
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Science, however, is not meant to align everyone and forever with the religion of immutable 
concepts. The supplicants of the machine religion (the machine fundamentalism) are captive to 
the circularity of religion: the machine and the machine metaphor are the outcome of human 
attempts to overcome their limitations, including those affecting the possibility of the knowing 
subjects to be able to know themselves. Those who claim today that our reality is the outcome of 
some larger machine (a computation, or a simulation [44]) are only bringing the solipsism 
religion farther than it ever was: we humans constructed science and now we search for 
experimental proof that it makes us, as we continue to search for answers relevant to our 
existence within circumstances so different from those reflected in Descartes’ views. It is no 
longer acceptable in science to maintain that the living and the non-living (the physical) are 
different. Official science (Handler 1970), and the pursuant reports on the state of knowledge in 
biology, proclaims that they are fundamentally the same.  
This is reflected in the beliefs of many practitioners. Whitesides [45], defining the new 
chemistry (recall the claim “life can be understood only in the language of chemistry”) describes 
its new ambitions: What is the molecular basis of life? (“…life is an expression of molecular 
chemistry”); How does the brain think? (“thought” is simply interacting molecules, and hence 
chemistry). A “new physics theory of life” [46] ascertains that matter, under some circumstances, 
acquires life attributes: “You start with a random clump of atoms, and if you shed light on it for 
long enough, it should not be so surprising that you get a plant.” Even Darwin’s theory becomes 
a special case of a more general physical phenomenon. Tegmark [47] went so far as to consider 
the universe made out of mathematics. Barabasi [48] generalizes from the large networks 
(Internet, for example) to protein interactions, not realizing that living networks are continuously 
reconfigured. Berry et al. [49] find shapes in nuclear astrophysics quite similar to those of a 
21 
 
 
cellular organelle. Of course, for these authors the stacked sheets of neutron stars are more 
complex. (The jargon of reductionism always implies degrees of complexity, without ever 
defining them.) Latash [50:136] argues that “Behavior of biological systems is based on basic 
physical law, common across inanimate and living systems . . .” That anticipation is definitory of 
the living—i.e., transcends the features (homeostasis, metabolism, growth, reproduction, etc.) he 
mentions—does not fit within the view of the living he presents. However, Latash leaves the 
door open (not unlike the authors of the 1970 report) to “. . . currently unknown physical laws 
that are specific for living systems.” Do they have to be physical?—is a question he, and many 
others sharing this view, does not address. 
These are only examples. Examining the position adopted by many researchers, it is clear 
that the official science program of the National Science Council and of the Academy of 
Sciences became ideology. Even foundations claiming to pursue alternatives (such as the well-
endowed Templeton Foundation) are ultimately practicing it. Suffice it to point out that, 
impervious to anticipatory processes, they embraced the so-called prospective psychology laden 
terminology of experiments impossible to replicate [51]. 
The official science ideology justifies a false premise, never proven, always assumed to be 
true (as God is assumed to be). It instrumentalized this premise, in science policy and the 
associated reward mechanisms, which forces those seeking support to align to the ideology. Not 
surprisingly, the machine that makes all machines—i.e., the computer—is exactly what the 
Church-Turing thesis ascertains: every physically realizable process can be computed by a 
Turing machine. A simple, deterministic recursively functioning device does it. This would make 
the claims of chemists and physicists nothing other than an expression in computation. The 
inference that living processes are Turing computations entails exactly the assumption of 
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Hilbert’s formalist program: semantics (of mathematical statements) is reducible to syntax. The 
machine internalizes all referents to the world in syntactic form. There is no isomorphism of any 
kind between the state of a machine and that of a living open system. This fact still escapes the 
logic of the preachers of the machine religion. Moreover, there are alternatives to the algorithmic 
Turing machine—which Turing himself considered [52] [53], in particular the assumption that 
everything can be measured. This is disregarded in the super-god religion of computation, where 
computation and algorithmic are considered equivalent. 
Rosen, as mentioned already, found fault with Pythagoras for this situation. To assume that 
mathematical truth, formal in nature, and at best the expression of cognitive performance upon a 
quantified representation of reality, corresponds to the dynamics of reality is conducive to a 
reduction of all there is to what can be mathematically represented, i.e., expressed in the 
language of mathematics. That a mathematics of living processes might be an alternative does 
not fit in the reductionist program. Gelfand [16] and Bernstein [54] (to whom we shall return) 
argued in favor of such a new mathematics. Probably along the same line of thinking is the 
inference that what does not align with the premise (i.e., is not algorithmic) has to be implicitly 
wrong. Therefore, non-determinism was declared a form of determinism, and open systems were 
qualified as canonically perturbed closed system. The opposite provides a more adequate 
understanding. Actually, there is a need for a comprehensive understanding of non-determinism, 
as well as for better descriptions of open systems, and of holism, as a characteristic of such 
systems. 
Inspired by Niels Bohr, one can hypothesize that we would be better off opting for a model 
of complementarity. This, by extension, applies to the experiment as a knowledge acquisition 
and validation method (among others) for everything pertaining to the physics of the world, and 
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empirical evidence, as interval series (or history) for the living. On account of interval series, 
interpretations of the data they afford lead to the category called story, which Kauffman [55] [56] 
(among others) called to the attention of the scientific community. This particular aspect 
deserves more detailed examination [57], if indeed story, in a well-defined sense, should become 
the outcome of life sciences and inform practical activities (such as healthcare). 
 
A distinguishing criterion 
Gödel’s concept of decidability (the logic pertinent to axiomatic systems used in arithmetic 
operations) can be applied in defining knowledge domains. It offers the possibility of describing 
the particular manner in which the physical and the living can be effectively distinguished by an 
observer (natural or artificial). Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems ascertain that any theory trying 
to describe elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete, i.e., is not decidable. 
The dynamics of physical reality is by its condition different from that of the dynamics of an 
evolutionary system (actually a system of embedded systems). The number of entities involved 
in physical processes, from the simplest (such as those described in Galileo’s mechanics and in 
Newton’s laws) to the more complicated (such as those captured in Einstein’s physics or even in 
quantum mechanics) is finite. This number does not increase along the timeline of change. 
Living processes are open ended. The number of entities is in continuous expansion. They are 
endlessly re-created. That Gödel’s theorems concern not only descriptions of reality (formal 
systems), but also reality might not be directly provable within the formalism in which they are 
expressed. However, they reflect the constructive nature of all human knowledge, about 
arithmetic as much as about anything else in the world. If mathematics and measurement are co-
substantial, logic (as in Gödel’s logical theorems) pertains to interpretation, and is co-substantial 
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with representation. Representations of the world change the world. The undecidable becomes, 
to use a figure of speech and not a precise qualifier, more undecidable. Moreover, Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle [58] shows that extending Gödel’s theorems to reality actually reflects our 
understanding of fundamental properties of material systems (he limited himself to quantum 
systems). 
On account of these considerations we can proceed with an effective distinction procedure. 
The focus in this alternative view is not on Gödel’s rigorous logical proof—which can be used in 
describing reality, and not only the numbers representing it—as it is on the notion of 
decidability, extended here from the formal domain to that of reality. 
Definition: An object of knowledge inquiry is decidable if it can be fully and consistently 
described. 
Indeed, physics, astronomy, geology (mentioned by Goodstein, as well as by many 
subsequent reports), knowledge domains where reproducibility of experiments is close to 100%, 
are descriptions of dynamics (how things change), i.e., representations of change that can be 
complete and consistent. 
Lemma: Experiments involving decidable processes are reproducible. Such descriptions 
undergird predictions—the expected output of science without necessarily guaranteeing it. 
Observation: The dynamics of the decidable—i.e., how entities that can be fully and consistently 
described change—is not necessarily a sufficient condition for making it predictive. The 
Poincaré problem regarding the 3-body dynamics is probably the best known example 
concerning this observation. 
Thesis 2: The threshold from the decidable to the undecidable is the so-called G-complexity (G 
for Gödel, obviously [59]).  
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The source of undecidability is the interaction through which the living is identified as 
anticipatory. If the notion of complexity conjures any meaning, it cannot be reduced to numbers 
or to the language of mathematics, which captures only quantitative aspects of dynamics. G-
complexity remedies the generality of the notion of complexity in favor of a distinction—the 
decidable—that can be probed. The cell is as undecidable as tissue, and moreover, as the 
organism it makes up. 
Thesis 3: Change above the G-complexity threshold is undecidable. 
Interactions are the concrete expressions of G-complexity. In the living, interactions 
continuously multiply. As the living returns to its physical condition (from senescent states to 
death), interactions decrease and settle in the decidable domain of physical and chemical 
interactions. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Characterizing the physical and the living 
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The living, in its unlimited variety of ever-changing forms is G-complex, i.e., it is 
characterized by undecidability. For non-living physical entities, interaction takes the specific 
form of deterministic reaction, expressed in physical laws (such as those expressed in Newton’s 
equations or in Einstein’s theory of relativity), or embodied in measurement devices. Time is 
expressed as duration.  
Change in the physical is unreflected: neither a stone nor a volcano is aware of the respective 
dynamics of how they change—and even less of why they change. They undergo change that can 
be observed, but which does not afford self-awareness. The observing subject, whose own 
condition is changed in the act of observation, takes note of their record of change (the duration 
sequence of the falling, the speed, the acceleration, the impact, or the detailed the sequence of a 
volcano’s eruption). Based on empirical observation, the observer can design experiments 
pertinent to the dynamics of falling or of a volcanic eruption (or whatever other physical 
phenomenon). The living observes and, most important, can affect its own change. For the 
living, change is the outcome of interactions in which the physical (the dynamics of action-
reaction) is complemented by anticipatory expression: current state contingent upon possible 
future state as it pertains to preserving life. Living entities (animals mostly) don’t simply fall; 
they know (implicit knowledge) how to fall, as long as anticipatory processes take place. The 
example of falling extends to all organisms. Tardigrades (among other so-called cryptobiotic 
organisms, i.e., living in states of suspended dynamics), like seeds, also behave in an anticipatory 
manner. The process can be described (in an anthropomorphic way of speaking) as following the 
Möbius strip trajectory back to life [60]. Put otherwise, there is a continuum of life akin to the 
Klein bottle geometry (surface and interior are on the same plane), as there is in every creative 
endeavor. From inspiration to artwork—this is yet another example documented by the entire 
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history of art and literature. The possible future state in the dynamics of cell interaction or in 
neuronal synapses is of a different nature, and easier to understand than that of the tick that can 
be in “suspended” life (up to 18 years) until the butyric acid of a body in its Umwelt [61] triggers 
its action. Change in the living is reflected in the form of its representation through successive 
states. Living interaction is not reducible to the physical action-reaction sequence.  
 
Fig. 4. Interaction and dynamics  
 
The description of physical interaction conjures quantity: its observation (measurement) 
results in data. The description of living interaction conjures quality: its observation results in 
information, i.e., data associated with meaning [62]. Information, characteristic of life, is not 
physical [63]. Lived time and clocked time are different. In the physical, the scale of time is 
constant; in the living, it is variable. 
 
Conclusion: Change is the outcome of interaction 
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Physics continuously provides experimental reproducible evidence concerning the cause-and-
effect perspective expressed in determinism. If the physical world should start over (using 
Gould’s suggestive replay of the film), its dynamics would, for all practical purposes, be the 
same. Evolution provides empirical evidence of its underlying process: anticipation. Successful 
anticipation drives survival.  If life were to begin again (replay the video), the outcome would be 
different in each such re-beginning, and not predictable. The reactive and the anticipatory are 
integrated in the dynamics of life. Anticipation, as the underlying process of evolution, is 
documented through empirical evidence. It expresses characteristics of the living such as 
adaptivity, holism, purposefulness, and creativity, and it provides the premise for understanding 
emotion, the relation between the embodied brain and mind interaction, the focus on meaning. 
To expect experiments involving the living (of interest not only to psychology, but also to the 
biomedical sciences and many other fields of inquiry pertinent to life) to be reproducible is 
epistemologically equivalent to reducing the living to its physical substratum, and biology to 
physics and chemistry (the reductionist doctrine). A particular form of this reduction is the 
machine model. Humans made the machine-god to replace the omnipotent, and after that they 
took the machine functioning predicated by the machine-god and committed to the practice of 
the machine-religion based on this belief. Experiments within this religion of the machine are 
reproducible, since they confirm the premise: the machine-god means that everything is a 
machine, or behaves like one, hence it is fully predictable. 
Another aspect of the same scientific theology is that of conditioning: we created god, 
defined the commandments, and expect everyone to submit to them as though they come from a 
higher authority. It is conditioning, with a reward mechanism attached to it: respect the 
“commandments” as though they were “god-sent.” The “god you made up” will reward you by 
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making you more god-like. In the machine-god phase, the same is practiced: the machine 
rewards those who accept that they are machines—and who behave accordingly—by making 
them more machine-like. Many experiments turn out to be mere instances of conditioning 
(psychology outperforms every other known discipline in this respect). Debunked many times 
over, conditioning became a feature of the very large body of “press the button” experiments—
act like a  machine—meant to legitimize user interfaces, cognitive aspects of perception, 
efficiency of behavioral treatment.  
In general, a limited understanding of causality as it pertains to life, i.e., transcends that of 
physics, dominates experiments concerning the living. By contrast, in modern physics, and not 
only in the quantum mechanics perspective, causality is gradually approached within a broader 
understanding of determinism and even openness to non-deterministic processes. Awareness of 
non-linearity and stochastic aspects of physical phenomena permeates such a view.  
Mapping from an open system (extending from the cells to the whole human being), of 
extreme dynamics, to the closed system of the experiment--which by definition is supposed to be 
decidable—might result in reproducibility. But what is reproduced is a false assumption, not 
knowledge-bearing hypotheses about change. The validity of some 40,000 fMRI studies, and 
more broadly the interpretation of neuroimaging results, was recently questioned [64], after the 
fMRI (25 years old) technology itself was critically assessed ([65] among others). False-positive 
rates of up to 70% concerning its most common statistical methods, which have not been 
validated using real data, are actually a proof of a replicated misguided assumption.  
But even within the mechanistic view of the living replication is by no mean guaranteed. As 
impressive as the Human Genome project was, it is a good example of irreproducible 
experiments (not to mention of its incompleteness). It was generated under the reductionist 
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assumptions of a blueprint—published as such [66]—of a homo sapiens that does not change 
over time, i.e., epigenetics ignored. What was extracted is a truncated image of gene syntax. The 
1000 Genomes Project (2008-2015), aimed at studying variation (initially ignored) and genotype 
data, is an example of an improved understanding but yet still another irreproducible experiment. 
It affords useful empirical data, i.e., access to some semantic aspects of gene expression. The 
goal, probably not yet on the radar of scientific inquiry, should be the pragmatic level, where 
meaning is constituted in the context of life unfolding in an anticipatory manner. However, that 
would entail the need to accept that experiments within the decidable are reproducible. The 
complementary is evident: experiments concerning the dynamics of the G-complexity domain 
(the living) cannot be replicated. They are of extreme importance to science, but more as a 
source of data—the time (actually duration) series of the observed phenomenon. The synchronic 
view (bearing the time stamp of the experiment clock) begs for its complementary diachronic 
representation of integrated processes—involving a variety of clocks and timescales.  
This idea is relatively well illustrated by the entire cycle of reproduction. Pregnancy [67] is a 
convincing example of anticipatory expression underlying creation, i.e., the birth of some entity 
that never existed before. For instance, anticipatory adaptations that diminish or eliminate the 
influence on the fetus of the mother’s stressful experiences take quite a number of forms (from 
the flow of energy favoring the new life to triggering lactation). Oxytocin is released in advance 
of parturition and during lactation. Maternal behavior is also changed in anticipation of the birth 
proper. An altered emotional condition parallels new endocrine and cognitive functions.   As was 
already pointed out, the living, pregnant or not, is in a continuous state of remaking itself, sui 
generis re-creation of its constitutive cells—each different from the other—and thus of the entire 
organism. The constancy of physical (non-living) entities, even those of extreme dynamics (such 
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as black holes), stands in contrast to the variability of any and all organisms and the matter in 
which they are embodied.  
An assumption similar to that of the Human Genome governs the current Connectome 
project. It will be ten or one hundred times more costly than the Genome project, but not more 
adequate in reporting on the variability of the cortex. Brain activity has become the showcase of 
computational modeling. There is, of course, much to gain from computational models in physics 
applications—the Juno space mission is only a recent spectacular example. In the biological 
realm an intrinsic limitation is ignored: algorithmic computation captures only the deterministic 
aspects of change. In addition, the premise that such processes are of algorithmic nature, was 
never proven—or at least questioned. The algorithmic is decidable; moreover, it is tractable. This 
means that the execution of the program representing the dynamics of the process represented by 
the computation takes a time represented by the polynomial of the steps required (for instance, 
for n steps, the polynomial function of n). 
 
Thesis 4: The decidable can be represented by a tractable algorithmic computation. 
 
Thesis 5: The living is not algorithmic. 
 
Thesis 6: The undecidable is not tractable, neither in computational form nor in any form of data 
processing. 
Even considering infinite computing resources of any kind of computation (analog, algorithmic, 
interactive, etc.)—which would undermine our current understanding of the relation between 
energy and data processing—the undecidable would remain intractable.  
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 The ants (phildris nagasan) that “cultivate coffee for accommodation” accumulated 
experience—in this particular form of agriculture—over millions of years [68], way longer than 
the human being. An inverse computation (from today to when this ants’ “agriculture” actually 
emerged), might explain the anticipatory characteristics of the elaborate process. But to perform 
it would take more than the energy involved in the evolution of life over that time. The physics 
of what the ants are doing is relatively simple; even an abacus would suffice for calculating how 
the process takes place. 
The guaranteed reproducibility of computational neuroscience experiments conjures 
knowledge and validation not about the brain, whose deterministic and non-deterministic aspects 
complement each other in its functioning, but about algorithmic computation. Interactive 
computation, as well as other forms of computation, in line with the dynamics of interaction of 
the living in general, and of the brain in particular, are rarely considered [69, 70]. 
Windelband’s [71] view of nomothetic science (expressed in universally valid laws, such as 
Newton’s laws of mechanics) and idiographic science (diachronic processes subject to empirical 
observations) could as well guide in defining new methods for gaining knowledge peculiar to the 
living. Let us recall all those biologists (not only Gould, mentioned above) who have been 
questioning the assumption that there are laws that describe the living. Biologists mostly are 
experiencing the uniqueness of each subject and wonder how this uniqueness (idiographic 
characteristic) can be described. There is a direct practical consequence to this distinction: 
medical care as a reactive praxis of fixing the “human-machine,” or individualized care (the art 
and science of healing) reflecting the awareness of uniqueness. A knee replaced is an example of 
an experiment replicated many times. A genetic-based treatment, of extreme individual nature, is 
as unique as the new attempts at immunotherapy in addressing conditions for which reactive 
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medicine is not an option. Moreover, the crisis of the experiment is also the crisis of our 
understanding of how knowledge is acquired, validated, and shared. Although the languages of 
visualization, modeling, and simulation are different from those of analytic expression, logic, 
mathematics, etc., we continue to expect some uniformity, as though the reality we question is by 
necessity homogenous. Peirce [72] suggested diagrammatic thinking as an alternative. So far, his 
ideas remain outside the mainstream of science. In recent years, Leamer [73], among others, 
contrasted “theory and evidence” vs. “patterns and stories.”   For some reason, neither biological 
theorists (such as Elsasser, Rosen, Pattee), and more recently Kaufmann [55], nor philosophers 
of the subject (in particular the competent Arran Gare [74]) has taken note of these 
developments. Even when the notion of story is mentioned, work in defining it (in contrast to the 
narrative) is ignored [75].  
Consequently, story remains a rather suspicious candidate, although the uniqueness of life 
phenomena speaks more in favor of variety (which stories can offer) than the replication of 
experiments. The proponents of physics as “the science of everything,” are grounded in its 
constructs. Those who advance alternative understandings of life processes know more about 
what they reject than what defines the culture of the subject of biology. For instance, they ignore 
contributions coming from outside their own context (such as those of researchers who worked 
in what used to be the Soviet Union, and who were severely censored). Just for the sake of the 
argument (i.e., integrating ideas from outside the culture shaped by the Cartesian view), let us 
mention that Bernstein [76] wrote about the “repetition without repetition” characteristic of the 
living as an expression of its dynamic variability. Machines provide mechanical repetition, which 
is their expected performance. On account of empirical evidence, this is yet another argument in 
favor of finally transcending the machine view characteristic of Cartesian determinism and 
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reductionism. Gelfand’s [77] take on the matter continuing Wigner’s line (on the effectiveness of 
mathematics in physics) points in the same direction: “There is only one thing which is more 
unreasonable than the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and this is the 
unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in biology.” Mathematics captures the decidable. 
Other descriptions, such as the record of a process, return testimony to the undecidable. Progress 
in science renders the need for a “new Cartesian revolution,” at the forefront of science’s efforts 
to better understand change in the specific manner in which it characterizes life. 
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